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The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change aims to keep warming below 2 °C while
recognizing developing countries’ right to eradicate extreme poverty. Poverty eradication is
also the first of the Sustainable Development Goals. This paper investigates potential
consequences for climate targets of achieving poverty eradication. We find that eradicating
extreme poverty, i.e., moving people to an income above $1.9 purchasing power parity (PPP)
a day, does not jeopardize the climate target even in the absence of climate policies and with
current technologies. On the other hand, bringing everybody to a still modest expenditure
level of at least $2.97 PPP would have long-term consequences on achieving emission
targets. Compared to the reference mitigation pathway, eradicating extreme poverty
increases the effort by 2.8% whereas bringing everybody to at least $2.97 PPP would
increase the required mitigation rate by 27%. Given that the top 10% global income earners
are responsible for 36% of the current carbon footprint of households; the discourse should
address income distribution and the carbon intensity of lifestyles.
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“End poverty in all its forms everywhere” is the first of theUnited Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs) adopted last September; setting targets of era-
dicating extreme poverty by 2030 for all people everywhere.
In parallel another United Nations process took place that
culminated in December 2015 where 195 countries adopted the
new Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change aiming at keeping warming to well
below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels in the long term while
recognizing developing countries right to eradicate extreme poverty
and develop sustainably (see UNFCCC1). These agreements pro-
vide a basis for putting the world economies on a sustainable
pathway. However, both agreements do not prescribe how these
ambitious goals may be achieved in a compatible manner, nor how
the burden or responsibility of achieving them may be shared.
These issues must be considered within the context of global
economic inequality and historical responsibility given that
developed countries are responsible for the majority of fossil CO2
emissions from 1750 to 20102 and the fact that only 18% of the
current global population enjoy First World living standards3
despite the large impacts from current levels of resource
extraction and through-put, while at the same time large parts
of the global population live at desperate poverty levels. For
example, 770 million people lived on <1.90$ a day in purchasing
power parities (PPP) (referred to as extreme poverty) in 20134,
and about half the world population lives on <2.97$ PPP a day5.
The global community has responded with numerous policy
goals to address the issue of extreme poverty, as well as
Sustainable Development. Sustainable Development requires to
meet the twin objective: to ensure that all people have the
resources needed, such as food, water, access to health care and
energy, to fulfill their human rights, and to ensure that human-
ity’s use of natural resources does not stress critical earth system
processes. According to the report The Action Agenda for
Sustainable Development by the UN’s Council of the Sustainable
Development Solutions Network (or SDSN)6, “sustainable
economic growth” should allow “all low-income countries to
reach the per capita income threshold of middle-income coun-
tries by 2030.”
Achieving the Paris target of limiting climate change to well
below 2 °C would not only require aggressive decarbonization in
rich countries but may also limit the aspirations of poor countries
as aggressive limits on greenhouse gas emissions can limit the
options for energy sector growth; and growth in energy use is
correlated with economic growth and poverty reduction, although
the strength of this link is subject to change dependent
on technology and consumption patterns7, 8. There is a rich
literature that views poverty as multidimensional and poorly
represented by income measures (e.g., refs. 8–10). The SDGs
themselves make reference to eliminating poverty in all its
dimensions and a focus merely on consumption represents a
limited point of view but is often seen as a reasonable approach
for capturing extreme poverty. There are numerous studies that
investigate distributional effects of carbon and energy policies at
regional and national levels11, 12. But to our knowledge there are
currently only very few global quantitative analyses (e.g., ref. 13)
of what poverty alleviation would mean in terms of carbon
implications and this is only a first step in this direction that uses
detailed information on consumption patterns of people living at
the edge of subsistence which is highly relevant to address poverty
issues. Despite limitations, quantifying the “climate-development
conflict” through greenhouse gas emissions associated with
energy consumption14 is a very useful first approximation as
energy is part of many household consumption activities as well
as being an essential input to production of goods and services in
all stages of global supply chains.
We find that in 2010, the global elite or top 10% of income
earners were responsible for 36% of global carbon emissions
whereas the extreme poor accounting for 836 million people, that
was 12% of the global population, contributed only 4% of global
emissions. Overall, the bottom half of global income earners
caused only about 13%. Based on these specific carbon footprints
for different income categories across the globe we find that
lifting people out of extreme poverty has only relative little carbon
implications with a projected increase of about 0.05 °C above the
IPCC base run by the end of the 21st century. However, when
moving the global poor, i.e., everybody below an income of $2.97
(in PPP) to the next income level, which is by the standards of
industrialized countries still fairly modest, we would add another
0.6 °C by the end of the century. This more ambitious scenario
would significantly increase the required speed and extent of
future emission reductions. Given that so far efficiency gains have
not been able to keep up with additional emissions a greater focus
on demand-side measures jointly with lifestyle and behavioral
change is called for especially considering the huge global carbon
inequality staying in the way of efforts towards a low carbon
society.
Results
We follow a simplifying approach to energy consumption and
energy poverty in households, especially in the Global South,
ignoring the role energy plays for households as an important
prerequisite to enable capabilities (e.g., refs. 12, 15). Our research
complements recent World Bank reports by Fay et al. and
Hallegatte et al.16, 17, that make the case that climate mitigation
policies can be introduced without slowing down poverty
reduction, but these do not calculate the impact of doing so on
global emissions. We approach this problem in several steps:
we first calculate the additional carbon caused by higher levels of
income and associated expenditure patterns; we then calculate the
temperature increase associated with higher carbon emissions
driven by increased consumption and associated increase
in production and production capacity. These changes are
introduced annually until 2030, in line with the SDG. We keep
technology, i.e., carbon intensity constant until 2030, considering
the uncertainty in technology, economic growth and policies (see
e.g., The International Energy Outlook18. Beyond 2030, we do not
make any assumptions about technical change but rather ask
which annual reduction in carbon emissions is required to
compensate for the additional carbon emitted through higher
consumption levels (see Rozenberg et al.19 for a similar question).
For calculating carbon footprints for different income groups, we
follow the consumption-based approach to carbon accounting
based on multi-regional input–output (IO) analysis. This allows
us to account for carbon emissions throughout global supply
chains, which are then allocated to the final consumer20. It not
only enables us to account for household’s carbon
emissions associated with direct emissions associated with heating
and cooling, cooking and transport but also accounting for the
carbon emitted during the production of products and
services consumed by different types of households. For the
consumption patterns in developing countries, we use the World
Bank’s Global Consumption Database21. This database contains
the most detailed depiction of consumption patterns and lifestyles
representing 4.5 billion people. For consumption patterns of
household groups in developed countries we use consumer
expenditure surveys of national statistical offices for the US22, the
EU23, Australia24, and Japan25.
Global carbon inequality. Once we calculate the carbon footprint
for each income group (Fig. 1) we get the following picture for
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2010, which is roughly in line with similar estimates26. The global
elite or top 10% of income earners (with incomes higher than 23$
PPP daily) are responsible for about 36% of global carbon
emissions for their consumption of goods and services emitted in
the production process along global supply chains. This would
comprise mainly the populations of the rich countries such as the
US, the EU, Japan, Australia, and Canada plus the elites of
developing countries and transition economies. In comparison,
the global poor or bottom 50% of income earners with income of
<$2.97 PPP cause about 15% of global carbon emissions. The
bottom half includes also the extreme poor of more than a billion
people in 2010 earning <1.90$ PPP and contributing <4% of
global carbon emissions.
This unequal distribution is also reflected in the respective
carbon footprints for each global income category. The
carbon footprint of the lowest income category is about 1.9 t
CO2-e whereas the global elite’s carbon footprint amounts to
26.3 t CO2-e per capita on average. The low direct carbon
footprint of the lower income categories might be partly due to
the omission of non-commercial biomass (see “Limitations”
section for further discussion). Whereas the lower income
households spend a larger share of their income on necessities
such as food, clothing and shelter, with increasing income
the share of luxury items, services and travel increases
(Supplementary Fig. 1).
Carbon implication of poverty alleviation. Extreme poverty, as
defined by the World Bank, has been cut in half since the 1990s.
But there are still one in five people in developing countries living
in extreme poverty. Extreme poverty is mainly found in fragile
and conflict-affected countries, predominantly in Southern
Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. While the SDGs set a goal for
eradicating extreme poverty, they do not specify how this might
be achieved. Thus to investigate the carbon implications of the
first SDG for moving the population in extreme poverty to
the next higher income level we do just that without assuming
changes in income in the other household categories or changing
technology. We take the consumption patterns and the associated
carbon footprint of people in extreme poverty (i.e, <$1.90 PPP)
and move them to the next income level and their associated
consumption patterns for the group $1.90–2.97 PPP by 2030,
with population growth at the growth rate of low income
countries according to the United Nations projection3. In
addition to increases in household consumption, we increase
proportionally government expenditure and investment to allow
for a necessary expansion of production capacity required to
supply the increase in household demand.
Since long-term climate impacts depend on cumulative carbon
emissions we then take the resulting additional carbon emissions
over time and add them to a baseline scenario. As baseline, we use
one of the greenhouse gases (GHG) emission trajectories, known
as representative concentration pathways (RCPs), adopted by the
IPCC for its fifth Assessment Report (AR5) in 2014 that is
consistent with limiting temperature changes to below 2 °C above
pre-industrial level, i.e., RCP2.6. The RCP2.6 emission scenario
assumes that global annual GHG emissions peak sometimes

















































































Fig. 1 Global income and carbon distribution in 2010 for household final demand plus associated government expenditure and capital formation. a Global
population share and global carbon contribution per expenditure category. Colors represent different expenditure categories and their respective shares of
the global population and global carbon emissions. b Per Capita carbon footprint per expenditure category in tons of CO2-e. Dotted line separates the direct































Move < $1.90 to $1.90 – $2.97




Fig. 2 Predicted increases in global temperature of different scenarios
dealing with extreme poverty. Move extreme poor <1.90$ PPP per day
above extreme poverty level. The green line shows the warming determined
by ending extreme poverty over the baseline (yellow line). 50% (dark
shading) and 66% (light shading) confidence ranges are obtained in
MAGICC by running the model 600 times each time using a slightly altered
set of climatic parameters that are based on historical observations.
See “Methods” for more details
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because they are produced to be independent from underlying
socio-economic assumptions as these projections can result from
very different Integrated Models. To convert emissions scenarios
into global-mean temperature we used MAGICC version 6.
Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Induced Climate
Change (MAGICC) is used in many scientific publications and
integrated models. It is also used by the IPCC to facilitate
integrated model comparisons. The results are presented in
Figs. 2 and 3.
The good news is that lifting people out of extreme poverty has
only relative little carbon implications with a projected increase of
about 0.05 °C above the IPCC base run by the end of the 21st
century. This relatively small increase makes intuitive sense given
the low per capita carbon footprint of the extreme poor. However,
the situation changes for a policy goal of not only eliminating
extreme poverty, but also where we move people into, what
may be considered as the global middle class (between the 50th
and 75th income percentile), which is by the standards of
industrialized countries a fairly modest income of between 2.97$
PPP and 8.44$ PPP per capita a day. For comparison, the middle
class in the developed world is quite far removed from what we
are referring to as the global middle class—in fact the global
middle class is below the developed world’s poverty line. When
moving everybody to a higher income level we add another 0.6 °C
by the end of the century. This is a fairly significant increase on
top of the IPCC scenario given that total increase in global
temperature since the industrial revolution is about 1 °C27 that
can significantly increase the required speed and extent of future
emission reductions.
Discussion
For a greater than 66% chance to keep average global temperature
below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, society can emit about
2900 Gt of CO2 from 1870 (Climate Change 2014 Synthesis
Report, p. 64, T 2.228) or about 800 Gt CO2 from 201729. Figure 4
shows the historic cumulative global CO2 emissions from 1870
through 2015 together with the predicted paths resulting from the
combination of our scenarios with and without poverty reduction
goals (solid lines), with and without mitigation to stay below 2 °C
above pre-industrial levels with 66% chance (dotted lines).
Average annual CO2 emissions reduction rates for the period
2017–2100 corresponding to each poverty reduction goal
required to stay below 2 °C with 66% probability are also shown
in Fig. 4. Using a standard simplified approach for the mitigation
scenarios as, for example, in Jackson et al.30, we find that the
mitigation rates needed to stay within 2° are −4.4%/yr if we
assume constant 2016 emission rates (36.4 Gt/year of CO2, just
0.2% higher than 2015, Le Quéré et al.29) without poverty targets,
−4.5%/yr if we add to the base the carbon needed to eliminate
poverty (<$1.90/week), and −5.5%/year if we add to the baseline
the carbon needed to bring people to the $2.97–8.44 range of
expenditure per week. Specifically, the average annual mitigation
rate for the incremental carbon emissions from eliminating
extreme poverty is 2.8% higher (0.1 percentage point increase)
than without poverty reduction goals. The mitigation rate for the
additional carbon from bringing people to $2.97–8.44 per week
range of income is 27.03% higher (1.1 percentage point increase)
than without poverty reduction goals (Fig. 4).
However, these technological solutions could be hard to
implement31. To meet the 2° target, even without the additional
carbon needed to lift people countries out of poverty, the world
already needs to decarbonize at an annual rate of more than 4%
from now on depending on population and economic growth
assumptions32. Only a handful of countries have been close to 4%
historically. Sweden has had the biggest success by decarbonizing
its economy at about 4% a year between 1970 and 1990 (IEA
data), mostly by replacing fossil fuels-based power plants with
nuclear and hydropower. France has managed to decarbonize at
3.8% with an analogous approach during the same period. More
recent (2000–2014) global rates have been much lower (about
1.3%) and for most western economies (<2%) these numbers are
inflated by a decreasing manufacturing sector and concomitant
increased imports33. The International Energy Outlook 2016
predicts small reductions in energy intensity and carbon intensity
over the 2012–2040 period. EIA reports that these forecasts are
highly uncertain as dependent on policies and regulations that
































Move $2.97 to $2.97 – $8.44
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Fig. 3 Predicted increases in global temperature of different scenarios
moving poorest to the global middle class. Move global poor (<2.97$PPP
per day) to next higher income category 2.97–8.44$ PPP per day. The
green line shows the warming determined by moving the less-than-2.97
$/day-income category (i.e., the lowest half of the global population) to the
group 2.97–8.44$ PPP/day over the baseline (yellow line). 50% (dark
shading) and 66% (light shading) confidence ranges are obtained in
MAGICC by running the model 600 times each time using a slightly altered
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Fig. 4 Historic cumulative global CO2 emissions from 1870 through 2015
and predicted paths. Gray dots before 2015 shows historical cumulative
CO2 emissions since 1870 in Gigatons (Gt). Solid lines after 2015 shows
predicted paths for each scenario and required annual reduction in carbon
intensity in percent to stay below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels with 66%
chance. Dotted lines after 2015 show predicted carbon emission paths if no
mitigation measures are taken
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technologies. EIA data18 show a declining ratio of CO2 emissions
to real GDP until about 2000, slowing down afterwards globally
and remaining flat for non-OECD and non-Annex I parties. Since
2000 emissions per unit of energy use have, in fact, been rising,
because of the greater use of coal. Most IPCC scenarios that leave
decarbonization to later dates, require negative emissions relying
on carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology that currently
show little prospect of being commercially deployable31. There
are numerous studies showing that technological advances have
not been as successful as initially thought. As an example, most
IPCC scenarios that have a good chance to keep the temperature
below 2° require negative emissions, some requiring substantial
implementation of this technology in the form of bio-energy
production with CCS (i.e. bio-energy with carbon capture and
storage or BECCS), as early as 2030 (IIASA scenario database).
However, implementing energy production combined with CCS
is proving much harder than expected34. According to the Global
CCS Institute35 there are 15 operational CCS projects around the
world, capable of capturing up to 30 million tons per year of CO2.
Despite success stories in some countries to reduce emission
intensities global carbon emissions have been on the increase (2%
in the 1970–2014 period and 2.45% since 2000) and reductions in
energy intensities or carbon intensity of fuel mix have been more
than compensated by additional emissions in economic growth
and lifestyle changes36. So far technology has not been able to
keep up with additional emissions and our scenarios would
require even more technological progress on top of what we
would have otherwise (see “Methods” references therein). This
increases the pressure on demand-side measures jointly with
lifestyle and behavioral changes, to reduce the amount of energy
required for transport, housing, etc. Given that the global elites
with carbon footprints of more than 26.3 t per capita are
responsible for 36% of the current carbon emissions a discussion
on global income distribution and carbon intensive lifestyles
should become part of the discourse of future efforts towards a
low carbon society.
Methods
Relationship to earlier studies. We use the consumption-based approach to
carbon accounting. This is a different approach from earlier papers, say for
example, by Chakravarty et al.71 and Chakravarty and Tavoni13 as our analysis is
based on supply chain carbon emissions that go beyond household direct energy
consumption, i.e., accounting for the carbon emitted during the production of
consumption items and services, which are then allocated to the final consumer,
and are based on very detailed information on income distribution and
consumption patterns. This latter point also distinguishes our paper from Chancel
and Piketty26 who use GTAP multi-regional IO (MRIO) for data on countries
incomes and emissions. But then, in order to move from country average emissions
to emissions of different individual (income) groups within countries they allocate
CO2 to different income quantiles using country-year average decile income/con-
sumption data from the World Bank. This is a top-down approach and does not
use the detailed consumer expenditure surveys at the household level for different
income groups as proposed here. The only paper we are aware of that addresses
within country inequality at the global level (Dennig et al.37) uses a modified
version of RICE one of the standard integrated assessment models (IAM), which is
based on 12 regions and World Bank data on national income, not detailed con-
sumption surveys. Most IAMs are based on very large regional aggregation and do
usually not account for income inequality between countries. For example,
MESSAGE–MACRO focuses on detailed complex “bottom-up” energy supply
sectors but still uses 11 world regions and does not have equivalent micro detailed
consumption at different income levels and developing countries and is not set up
to address poverty or inequality issues. The same holds for iPETS which has 31
regions, however very aggregated when it comes to poorer countries (for example
sub-Saharan Africa is one region). In contrast, we use 90 developing countries
provided by the World Bank’s Global Consumption Database and representative
developed countries, including the US, 27 EU countries, Australia, and Japan (see
below for more detail). That is not to discredit in any way the function and
importance of the IAMs but they are built for other purposes and each of these
approaches has its own strengths and weaknesses and each provides a different
perspective on the policy options available to meet climate change targets. Extreme
poverty is typically defined in terms of satisfying immediate basic needs such as
food and shelter, needed for long-term physical well-being. Thus, we believe that
our approach using detailed household expenditure data, with great detail for a
large number of developing countries, contributes a different and useful
perspective.
Carbon footprints and consumer expenditure surveys. We use multi-regional
input-output (MRIO) analysis to compute household carbon footprints for dif-
ferent income groups for 189 countries. The carbon footprint includes direct
emissions associated with a household’s activities such as heating, driving and
using electricity as well as indirect emissions associated with the production of
goods and services a household consumes24, 25 as well as assumed associated shares
of required investments and government expenditure to support increase in pro-
duction capacity. The consumption patterns of different household groups in 90
developing countries are provided by the World Bank’s Global Consumption
Database21 and households in developed countries are based on national consumer
expenditure surveys reported by the respective national statistical offices. The
global MRIO table is collected from the Eora database38. Eora is a multi-region IO
database that provides a time series of high-resolution IO tables with matching
environmental and social satellite accounts for 186 countries. This study focuses on
2010 to be consistent with the World Bank’s Global Consumption Database.
In the World Bank’s Global Consumption Database, households in developing
countries are categorized in four consumption segments: lowest, low, middle, and
higher consumption groups. They are based on global income distribution data,
which rank the global population by income per capita, which we use and scale up
by actual global population shares for each income category. The lowest
consumption segment (below $2.97 per capita a day) corresponds to the bottom
half of the global population; the low consumption segment (between $2.97 and
$8.44 per capita a day) to the 51th–75th percentiles; the middle consumption
segment (between $8.44 and $23.03 per capita a day) to the 76th–90th percentiles;
and the higher consumption segment (above $23.03 per capita a day) to the 91st
percentile and above (Supplementary Fig. 1). The monetary values are in PPP39.
Purchasing power parities tells us how many dollars are needed to buy a dollar’s
worth of goods in a country as compared to the United States. In other words, PPP
estimates the amount of adjustment needed of the exchange rate between countries
in order for the exchange to be equivalent to each currency’s purchasing power.
The first of the UN SDGs, which we are exploring in this study, is to move
people out of extreme poverty by 2030, defined as <$1.90 PPP per day. However,
the World Bank global consumption database (WBGCD) provides only the
consumption patterns for the group with consumption of <$2.97 PPP per day. To
estimate the carbon emissions per capita associated with consumption for the
people spending <$1.90 PPP per day, we first select the poorest countries with an
average expenditure of <$1.90 PPP per day or $456 PPP per year and use their
average per capita consumption data as representative of the poorest income
category (<$1.90 PPP per day) at the global level.
While the WBGCD represents the consumption patterns of the low income
categories it is less representative for consumption patterns of higher income
categories which represents consumers from developed countries. Thus in addition
to the consumer expenditure surveys for 90 developing countries included in the
World Bank’s global consumption database (http://datatopics.worldbank.org/
consumption/) we included consumer expenditure surveys from the US22, the
EU23, Australia24, and Japan25. Population data for different consumer groups were
collected from the World Bank Povcalnet4. According to the PovcalNet database,
developed countries only have a share of about 1% of the global population in the <
$8.44 consumption groups. In terms of global middle income ($8.44–23.03),
developed countries’ share in this group accounts for about 19%, while their share
of the global high consumer group (>$23.03) is 89%. Therefore, we use the World
Bank’s 90 developing countries’ consumption data (accounting for 89% of total
population in developing countries) to estimate per capita carbon footprint for the
extreme poor (<$1.9 PPP per day), $1.9–2.97 PPP per day, and $2.97–8.44 PPP
per day. To calculate the footprint for the $8.44–23.03 group, we split the countries
into two groups. We use the consumption expenditure data of this consumer group
of the 90 developing countries in the World Bank’s consumption database
(representing 72% of the global total in that category; developing countries account
for 81%) and consumer expenditure surveys from the US, Japan, Australia and EU
to represent consumption patterns in developed countries (representing 16% of the
global total in that category; developed countries account for 19% in this category);
their combined share is 87% of the global total in that category. For the highest
consumer group (>$23.03) we used the average expenditure for people falling in
that consumer category from the 90 developing countries (representing 8% of the
global total in that category), the EU, Japan, Australia and the US, which represent
about 73% of the global population in that category.
The multi-regional input–output approach. In a MRIO framework, different
regions are connected through inter-regional trade. The technical coefficient sub-
matrix Ars consists of arsij
n o
is given by arsij ¼ trsij =xsj , in which trsij represents the
inter-sector monetary flows from sector i in region r to sector j in region s; xjs is the
total output of sector j in region s. The final demand matrix is yrsi
 
, where yrsi is
the final demand of region s for goods of sector i from region r. Using matrix
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notation and dropping the subscripts, we have
A ¼
A11 A12    A1n

































Consequently, the MRIO framework can be written as:
x¼ I Að Þ1y ð1Þ
where x is a colum vector of sectoral total output for all countries; (I-A)–1 is the
Leontief inverse matrix which captures both direct and indirect economic inputs to
satisfy one unit of final demand in monetary value; I is the identity matrix with
ones on the main diagonal and zeros everywhere else; y is a column vector of
sectoral total final demand for all countries.
To calculate the consumption-based CO2-e emissions, we extend the MRIO
table with a vector of sectoral CO2-e emission coefficients for all regions, k:
k ¼ k1 k2    kn½ 
Thus, the total consumption-based CO2-e emissions for all regions can be
calculated by:
CO2-e ¼ k I Að Þ1YþHHC ð2Þ
where CO2-e is a row vector of the total CO2-e emissions (both supply chain
emissions and household direct emissions) associated with total final consumption
(Y), sum of household consumption, government expenditure and stock change
and investment, in all countries; k is a row vector of CO2-e emissions per unit of
economic output for all economic sectors in all regions. k (I-A)–1Y, a row vector,
captures supply chain emissions of final demand of goods and services in different
countries; HHC is a row vector of household direct emissions of all regions, e.g.,
driving and house heating;
Household direct emissions for each consumption group in different countries
are estimated based on their household fuel consumption from the consumer
expenditure survey data.
Matching consumption survey to MRIO household consumption. In the
WBGCD21, and the global multi-regional IO database38 have been developed
to enable global analyses and are uniform across countries. To match the con-
sumption categories provided by the Global Consumption Database with Eora
economic sectors we follow a well-established approach (e.g., refs. 40, 41). We first
assign consumption items from the WBGCD to different IO sectors and then scale
the consumption survey data for each sector by four income groups to match the
total household consumption of each sector from the global MRIO table (see
Bridge Matrix in Supplementary Data). This method assumes that national
consumption data is more accurate than the consumption survey data in terms of
total consumption of each good or service. However, the survey date provides
useful information about the distribution of goods and services to different income
groups.
In the WBGCD database, all consumption items are categorized according to
the International Comparison Program (ICP) classification, equivalent to the
international Classification of Individual Consumption According to Purpose
(COICOP). To estimate the carbon footprints of different consumption groups, we
first map the ICP classification of consumption items to aggregate Eora IO sectors.
Three situations can occur:
● One ICP category in the WBGCD corresponds to one Eora sector. In some
cases there is a perfect match between an ICP category and an Eora sector. The
mapping is straightforward.
● Multiple ICP categories correspond to one Eora sector. For example, in the
ICP category, “Processed fish and seafood”, “Cheese, butter and margarine”,
“Other edible oil and fats” can only fit to Eora sector Food & Beverages. Given
the more detailed ICP classifications than the Eora sector, this allocation is the
most frequent case in the matching process. Mapping is also straightforward
in this case.
● One ICP category in the WBGCD corresponds to more than one Eora sector.
There are some cases that one consumption item category may be produced
from multiple economic sectors. For example, some food consumption
categories can either be sold directly from the farm and thus would be linked
to Eora sector “Agriculture” or have been processed and thus need to be linked
to Eora sector “Food & Beverages”. However, there is no good reference to
split the aggregate consumption categories, such as “Fresh or Chilled
Vegetables Other than Potatoes”, into “Agriculture” and “Food &Beverages’
sectors”. And, the allocation of an aggregate consumption category might vary
from country to country. Most studies ignore this problem42 and just equally
distribute the aggregate category in consumption (as, e.g., done by the World
Bank’s Global Consumption Database) or when linking environmental
accounts to IO accounts (e.g., ref. 43), or numerous IO studies linking
consumer expenditure survey to IO categories (e.g., refs. 41, 44). We followed
this practice for this study but also added an uncertainty analysis using an
allocation approach based on different possible “extreme” bridging matrices.
We select the possible IO sectors that can be linked to the ICP sectors. For the
maximum value, we assign the ICP category to the sector with the highest
emissions multiplier, for the lowest possible value, we assign the ICP category
to the sector with the lowest emission multiplier. We then take these extreme
or maximum possible deviations from the allocation we had chosen and
calculate the deviation for each household group and show the range through
error bars for each household category (Supplementary Fig. 2). Our
uncertainty analysis shows that re-allocation of the consumption categories
that may fall into multiple economic sectors has a relatively small impact on
per capita footprints of different household groups. The uncertainty range of
the per capita CF for all household groups is <2% between the max and the
min and even less of an issue for our scenarios only involving the lowest two
income categories.
Other final demand sectors by consumer groups. In addition to household
consumption we also include other two final demand sectors, government
expenditure and capital formation, to accommodate the necessary expansion of
production capacity required to produce the increase in household demand. We
allocate capital formation and government expenditure column vectors from
EORA MRIO database to the four consumer groups based on the share of
household consumption by different consumer groups in the total household
consumption. Equation (3) was used for disaggregation of capital formation and
government expenditure.
CapDisagg ¼ diag Capð ÞHHshare ð3Þ
where CapDisagg is disaggregated capital formation by four consumer groups; Cap
is a vector of capital formation by sectors; and diag(Cap) denotes a diagonal matrix
with the elements of vector CAP on the main diagonal. HHshare is a matrix
showing the shares of consumption by different consumer groups in different
sectors.
This method assumes that the higher the consumption for a certain product the
higher the required capital formation in that sector. Lacking better information, we
make the same assumption for government expenditure. For example, we allocate
the government expenditure column to different consumer groups based on their
consumption of other services from the consumer expenditure survey data.
Scenario analysis. In this study, we set up two scenarios for future additional
carbon emissions due to moving poor people out of poverty by 2030 but these
emissions are then continued until 2100 to be consistent with IPCC climate change
projections. Scenario 1: lifting all people spending <$1.90 PPP per day (i.e., 840
million people45) to a higher consumption group spending between $1.90 and
$2.97 PPP per day by 2030, equally spread over the years, with an average of 56
million people moving out of poverty per year. Scenario 2: lifting all people with a
per capita income of <$2.97 PPP per day to a higher expenditure group spending
between $2.97 per day and $8.44 per day by 2030 with an equal share of people
annually moving to the next higher consumption group. We also incorporate
population growth into the model. As population growth data for different
consumption groups in different countries is not available, we use the UN
population growth projection3 for this study. Then, we use population growth rates
by different country classifications (low income, lower middle income, upper
middle income, and high income) to represent different growth rates in different
consumption groups. For instance, we use the average growth rate in low income
countries (i.e., <$1045 per capita per year) for the <$1.90 and $1.90–2.97 PPP
consumption groups, while we use the average growth rate in lower middle
countries (i.e., $1046–4125 per capita per year) to represent the growth rate for the
$2.97–8.44 consumption group. In terms of changing fertility rates associated with
higher incomes we assume that people moving up to a higher consumption group
will have the same fertility rates as their new income peers, otherwise we strictly
stick with the UN predictions.
Since long-term climate impacts depend on cumulative carbon emission we add
the additional emissions needed to achieve the SDGs of moving people out of
extreme poverty to a baseline emission pathway. (By additional emissions, we mean
the higher emissions based on the new expenditure group minus previous
emissions in the lower expenditure group.) As baseline, we use one of the GHG
emission trajectories, known as Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs),
adopted by the IPCC for its fifth Assessment Report (AR5) in 201446. RCPs are
concerned with GHG concentration trajectories but the database provides, as a
supplement, emission trajectories calculated as inverse emissions, i.e., implied
emissions corresponding to the scenario concentrations, using the MAGICC model
(see below). These standardized scenarios emphasize not only the long-term
emission stabilization level but also the trajectory that leads to that outcome. We
use the scenario that is consistent with limiting temperature changes to below 2 °C
above pre-industrial level, i.e., RCP2.6. The RCP2.6 (now referred to as RCP3PD in
the database, where “PD” stands for Peak and Decline and 3 refer to radiative
forcing, in watts per square meter units, predicted by the year 2100) emission
scenario assumes that global annual GHG emissions peak sometimes before 2020
and decline substantially afterwards. Other scenarios include RCP4.5, RCP6, and
RCP8.5. These are all plausible pathways. We chose RCP2.6 here because the
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research question we are addressing is whether meeting the SDGs can be achieved
without affecting the climate goal47.
RCP scenario data contain reference GHG emissions. However, the database
does not report socio-economic variables underlying each scenario. We present
un-abated emissions. To convert emissions scenarios into global-mean
temperatures we used MAGICC version 648. MAGICC is essentially a reduced-
complexity model used in many scientific publications and integrated models. It is
also often used by the IPCC, for instance, to facilitate integrated model
comparisons. MAGICC integrates a set of simple models linking emissions to
concentrations to global radiative forcing and to global changes in temperature and
sea-level. For more details see refs. 49, 50. 50 and 66% confidence ranges are
obtained in MAGICC by running the model 600 times using a slightly altered set of
climatic parameters that are based on historical observations. Details of this
approach are available in51.
Limitations. The United Nations52 in a resolution adopted by the Assemble set 17
goals focusing on poverty alleviation, hunger, inequality and inclusion, gender,
education, access to water and sanitation. Many of these so-called UN SDGs are
related to income but the selected examples already show that poverty goes
beyond simply income. This multi-dimensionality of poverty is well reflected in the
literature recognizing that income measure alone are a poor representation of
poverty9, 10. Albeit true, many of these ailments are linked to income especially at
the lowest level of consumption where people spend most of their money on basic
consumption items such as food, clothing and shelter (see also Supplementary
Fig. 1 based on consumer expenditure patterns of the World Bank (WP)’s poverty
database). In this study we focus explicitly on the first SDG and look at the
implications of moving people to a higher expenditure group.
The WB database is based on consumer expenditure surveys for 90 developing
countries and four expenditure categories and here supplemented by consumer
expenditure surveys from developed countries. In our scenarios we move people
from one expenditure category to the next (crossing the poverty line) assuming the
consumption patterns of the higher expenditure group. The carbon emissions are
based on greenhouse gas emissions as represented in the global MRIO database
captured through market exchange. We account for carbon emissions associated
with burning fuels such as char coal, crop residues and other biomass for cooking
and heating when captured through market transactions in the consumer
expenditure surveys. These fuel sources can be a substantial part of the livelihoods
(e.g., ref. 53). As incomes increase, biomass does not simple get replaced by other
fuels but households tend to use a wide mix of fuels in their fuel transitions54, we
capture those transitions only when reflected in the consumer surveys. If rural poor
replace biomass with paid-for energy than we ignore the potential positive impact
on reduced deforestation. Similarly, we do not deal with other land use related
carbon emissions associated with subsistence agriculture. At these low levels of
income any additional income would not replace these forms of livelihood income
but rather would help diversify their livelihoods55.
In this study we do not account for land use related emissions. The literature on
how poverty alleviation would change land use at a global level is quite inconclusive
and really beyond what we could hope to achieve in this paper. Most of the studies
that link land use to consumption patterns are at the regional scale56 or at best at
the national level57, and frequently do not explicitly account for differences in
income. The few global level studies show that land consumption seem to increase
with higher income58.
A somewhat related problem is the different impacts of meat consumption
versus other food intake, which have quite different environmental impacts in
terms of land use, but are more relevant for our study in terms of methane
emissions. While we do account for these differences in terms of emissions, we do
not do this in the best possible way as meat consumption is subsumed as part of
consumption of agricultural products. Higher income people would pay higher
prices for agricultural products and thus cause higher carbon emissions. In this
sense we have captured differences in meat versus vegetable consumption. A better
way would have been to have a more disaggregated global model to better capture
different types of food consumption. Part of the problem is the trade-off of sectoral
detail and country coverage of different global multi-regional IO models. For a
recent comparison of various global MRIOs see ref. 59.
In this study, we make the assumption that the consumption bundles of each
expenditure group remains the same until 2030, in particular for the low
expenditure group included in our scenario analysis. While there is a huge amount
of literature focusing on consumption patterns within income/expenditure
categories this is less so at the global level as discussed in this paper; but the goal of
the paper is not to predict carbon emissions for the year 2030 or 2100 but to
investigate the implications of two poverty alleviation scenarios (of moving people
from a lower category to a higher one) by 2030 using available detailed data on
consumption for different expenditure and income categories from the World
Bank and other statistical agencies. We want to investigate these counter factual
scenarios based on detailed available data and do not want to “dilute” these
scenarios by modifying existing consumption bundles in all income categories
other than moving people from one category and the associated consumption
bundle to the next. Supplementary Table 1 shows that there is considerable stability
in terms of expenditure patterns across the poor in that three quarters of the
expenditure is for food, shelter and housing, and the remaining expenditure
categories only make small contributions to the expenditure.
This is also reflected in the literature. The most important determinant of the
carbon footprint is income (see e.g., Minx et al.; Ahmad et al.40, 60), which we
consider explicitly in our two poverty alleviation scenarios but other determinants
of per capita carbon footprints such as urban characteristics61, population
density62, lifestyles (Baiocchi et al 41), and household size63, etc. are not considered
in this study as these do not exist at the global level and most of the countries we
include in our study, and are only available for specific countries or selected cities.
In summary, the “constant consumption assumption” for the poor for the next
decade or so is reasonable given that income and associated composition are the
most important factors and we change them explicitly based on detailed available
information; and that we are only interested in the counter factual poverty
alleviation scenario and their carbon implications. Moreover, there is a lack of
available studies for most countries considered in this study; and finally, we find a
relative stability of consumption patterns of the poorest in poor countries.
Similarly, we use current emissions intensities (from Eora) until 2030, ignoring
well-established hypothetical trends of reducing energy intensity and climate
policy. This assumption would probably overestimate the poor’s future emissions.
Rather than explicitly modeling various technological assumption as is done by
Rao64 we calculate the additional carbon emissions of poverty alleviation and the
required reduction in carbon emissions. These additional carbon emissions of
poverty alleviation are added to the RCP2.6. The RCP are abstracted from possible
socio-economic scenarios that can produce them in agreement with (e.g., Moss
et al.65). According to the IPCC AR5: “The RCPs ARE NOT [emphasize added]
associated with unique socioeconomic assumptions or emissions scenarios but can
result from different combinations of economic, technological, demographic,
policy, and institutional futures” (Wayne66, p. 8). “RCPs each describe an emission
trajectory and concentration by the year 2100, and consequent forcing. Each
trajectory represents a specific synthesis drawn from the published literature. From
this “baseline”, researchers can then test various permutations of social, technical
and economic circumstances.” (Wayne66, p. 9) And this is exactly how we are using
the RCP as a reference emission trajectory to assess the carbon consequences of
poverty alleviation. We do not make any assumption of whether innovations and
technical change will deliver or not. We “just” assume, based on the IEA report,
that in the next 12 years that might not be major changes in carbon intensity. We
only calculate the additional gains in reduction required to offset the additional
carbon emissions from poverty alleviation.
Another important component of the poverty alleviation scenario is the
estimation of population growth. Estimation of population growth is ideally based
on the population projections for each income group in each country until 2100.
However, these data are not available. On the other hand, we understand that
different countries may have different population growth rates and using the
average growth rate for low income countries for the low consumption group may
lead to relatively large uncertainty. Given the predictions available from the UN
World Population Prospects3 we have two choices: (1) to use predictions that
represent income segments and thus requires averaging across countries (the
average population growth rate for countries within an income bracket) based on
estimates by the UN, for example, we use the average population growth rate of low
income countries to represent the population growth for the extreme poverty group
and the consumption group of >$2.97 per day, and use the population growth rate
of lower middle income countries for the consumption group of $2.97–8.44
per day; or (2) to use country specific predictions but ignore the changing
composition of expenditure groups (population growth rate by country). Both
estimates have shortcomings. Applying the national average growth rate to the low
income group within a country may lead to an underestimation of population
growth for low income groups as their growth rate might be higher than the
national average67. However, using the average population growth rate across all
low income countries may also lead to uncertainty because countries have different
population growth rates even though they all fall into the low income country
category. In this study, we use option (1) i.e., using the average growth rate of the
respective country group mainly because the country specific predictions are not an
option to us anymore after we introduce our poverty alleviation scenarios as these
would significantly influence income and thus fertility and mortality rates of these
low income countries and the country specific predictions by the UN would not be
applicable to these countries anymore. When comparing the two approaches, we
find that option 2 provides 13% lower carbon emissions under scenario 1 and 18%
lower under scenario 2 than by using option 1.
The scaled investment and government expenditure is likely to have some
benefits for the poor but it is hard to estimate which benefits they accrue. For
example, one might argue that a lot of the infrastructure investment benefits more
the middle class, who can extract greater benefit from such investments. A simple
example is road-building which leads to increased vehicular mobility. Those in
extreme poverty have little to benefit from this road-building. We thus see these
expanded government expenditure and investment as accompanying the expansion
in producing those additional goods and services associated with poverty
alleviation but they are not the trigger of poverty alleviation. These initial transfer
payments are not explicitly included in this study.
There are a number of ways that government expenditure can lead to poverty
alleviation such as direct payment transfer (cash transfer) which are being trialed or
implemented in Brazil68 and India69, and direct and indirect subsidies (e.g., fuel
subsidies, food subsidies, poverty programs)72, 73. However, we did not include any
such payment transfer and/or subsidies or similar mechanism to increase the
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income of the poor as outlined in these scenarios due to the complexity of these
wealth distribution mechanism. However, this problem is partially mitigated by the
use of expenditures instead of actual income, which is hard to measure in poorer
countries. There is evidence that households in poorer countries have negative
savings as they appear to spend more than they earn (see, e.g., Fesseau and van de
Ven70). The fact that these types of transfer are implicit in the expenditure data is
the standard justification for choosing expenditure over income in many studies.
Code availability. Programming code for MRIO analysis is available from the
corresponding author on request.
Data availability. All data used in this study is from open access sources, including
the World Bank Global Consumption Database, EORA MRIO database, the World
Bank Povcalnet and the UN Population Prospects. The websites for data download
are provided in the method section.
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